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Rational choice theory has been one of the key theories used to explain the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism policies (Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005; Enders & 
Sandler, 1993; 2003; Frey, 2004; LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009). These investigations 
have examined policies focused on increasing the costs of committing political violence, 
such as criminalization, increased police presence, and government strikes. However, few 
investigations have looked at policies that increase the benefits of not committing 
political violence such as negotiations and amnesties. In this study, I investigate the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism policies that seek to increase the benefits of not 
committing terrorism. I use Algeria as a case study and examine three counterterrorism 
policies between 1994 and 2004. One of the policies is a traditionally deterrent policy 
that increases the consequences of committing terrorism while the two other policies 
represent alternatively deterrent policies that increase the benefits of not committing 
terrorism.  
To analyze these policies, I use ARIMA modeling (N=120 months) and the 
Global Terrorism Database to determine whether each policy led to a significant change 
 
 
in overall attacks and the proportion of fatal attacks. While researchers have found mixed 
results when studying the effectives of traditional deterrence counterterrorist measures 
(Dugan, LaFree & Piquero; Enders & Sandler, 1993; Enders, Sandler & Cauley, 1990; 
LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009), I found that the Civil Concord Act, an amnesty program, 
as well as the Rome Platform, a negotiation policy, were related to a significant reduction 
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"Le terrorisme naît de la solitude, de l'idée qu'il n'y a plus de recours, que les murs sans 
fenêtres sont trop épais, qu'il faut les faire sauter" 
 “Terrorism is born from solitude, from the idea that there is no other way-out, that the 
walls without windows are too thick, that it is necessary to explode them.” 
-Albert Camus 
Albert Camus, an Algerian writer and philosopher once wrote that terrorism is 
born from a perceived lack of options. According to Camus, there are roadblocks that are 
so impenetrable that it is necessary to resort to extreme violence. However, until recently, 
governments such as the United States have not used a broad range of counterterrorist 
tactics (Bapat, 2006). When Ronald Reagan famously stated that the United States would 
not negotiate with terrorists, he removed the option of negotiation as a tool to combat 
terrorism. There has been a recent push by some academics and practitioners to more 
rigorously examine the effectiveness of counterterrorist policies (see Lum, Kennedy & 
Sherley, 2006) and some research has shown that aggressive sanctions such as military 
strikes, increased prison penalties, and ousting suspected terrorists through camp raids 
have not been effective at reducing terrorism (Enders, Sandler & Cauley, 1990; Frey, 
2004; LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009).  
The purpose of this Master’s Thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of 
negotiating with terrorists using Algeria as a case study. More specifically, using 
organizational level crime theories, I look at the role of presenting options to terrorists as 
a form of counterterrorism in Algeria between 1991 and 2004. I begin with a brief review 
of rational choice theory and its application to terrorism followed by a discussion of 
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recent terrorist events in Algeria. Finally, I use an interrupted time-series analysis to test 
the success or failure of negotiating with those who use terrorism. 
The definition of terrorism has been a hotly debated issue among policy makers 
and researchers (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Weinberg, Pedahzur 
& Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). For the purposes of this thesis, I will be using the LaFree and 
Dugan (2007, p.184) definition, “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence 
to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or 
intimidation.” In this research, I assume that counterterrorism policies and tactics are 
governmental initiatives aimed at combating terrorism. Algeria serves as an important 
case study because of its decades of terrorism and violence. During the 1990s and 2000s, 
Algeria lost between 100,000 and 200,000 people due to political violence and terrorism 
(Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2009). However, this wave of violence was not an 
isolated event in Algeria’s history. The Algerian War for Independence (La guerre 
d’Algérie) from France, which lasted from 1954 through 1962, was characterized by 
gruesome violence. Although numbers vary, Horne (2006) estimates that there were 
approximately 700,000 fatalities through the course of the eight year war. On July 3, 
1962 French President Charles de Gaulle proclaimed Algeria an independent state, which 
left the North African nation with the onerous task of creating a unified country after 
centuries of colonial rule (Hill, 2006; Horne, 2006).  
To help explain the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies in Algeria, I draw 
on insights from organizational level rational choice theory (RCT). Clarke and Cornish 
(1985) were the first to integrate economic RCT into criminology, which states that 
humans are rational thinkers that seek to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. As 
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rational thinkers, humans weigh the benefits of committing a crime against the 
consequences of committing a crime. Organizational RCT seeks to explain actions 
committed by groups as opposed to actions solely committed by individuals (Paternoster 
& Simpson, 1996; Vaughan, 1996).  
As the result of the frequency of terrorist attacks in Algeria, the government used 
a number of counterterrorist tactics to attempt to curb the violence. In this study, I look at 
three specific counterterrorist interventions: the Rome Platform, criminalization of 
terrorism, and the Civil Concord Act. Two of the interventions, the Rome Platform and 
the Civil Concord Act, were designed to serve as negotiating strategies to reduce 
terrorism through legitimization and forgiveness respectively. In this study, 
criminalization is a control to examine the effectiveness of a traditionally deterrent 
counterterrorist strategy. 
To determine the effectiveness of each of the policies I use ARIMA modeling. 
ARIMA modeling separates the effect of an intervention from the random shocks that 
occur in time series data (Dugan, forthcoming). By parsing the effects of a 
counterterrorism policy from the natural patterns present in the observations, I am able to 
determine if any of the policies were associated with a significant change in the 






 In this section I outline how rational choice theory supports my investigation of 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. I begin with a brief discussion of rational 
choice theory followed by a discussion of how rational choice theory fits into the 
framework of studying terrorism. I continue with a discussion of the importance of using 
reward-based rational choice theory and conclude with an argument for why 
organizational level theories are necessary when investigating behaviors of individuals in 
terrorist groups. 
Rational Choice Theory: Overview 
Rational choice theory (RCT) has a long history in economics literature (e.g. 
Simon, 1955). Rational choice theory stems from the idea that humans are rational 
thinkers that use the information around them to make decisions intended to maximize 
positives and minimize negatives. In criminology, RCT predicts that rational actors 
weigh the benefits of committing a crime against the costs of committing the crime (e.g. 
Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Paternoster & Simpson, 1993). Rational choice theory and 
deterrence theory stem from the Neo-Classical criminological idea that potential 
criminals will be less likely to commit crimes if punishments are more certain, severe, 
and swift (Vold, Bernard & Snipes, 2002). However, one important distinction RCT 
makes from deterrence theories is that humans are not perfectly rational beings and that 
there are internal and external factors that affect decision making (Simon, 1955).  Within 
the criminological application of RCT Clarke and Cornish (1985) used the term “bounded 
rationality” to describe these internal and external factors.  
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Additionally, in economics, theorists discuss the idea of utility functions (e.g. 
Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare, 1994; Nash, 1950). Utility, as described by 
philosophers and economists, is the set of values that dictates the desirability and 
preference of various ideas, goods or actions. Like bounded rationality, utility helps 
explain why someone would engage in crime when the potential consequences of 
committing the crime are so high. For example, a teenager choosing to steal a car to 
impress his friends is clearly valuing the social status of car theft over the consequences 
of being caught. While acts of terrorism stem from larger goals like independence or 
religious revolution, the concepts of value and utility remain the same. If a potential 
terrorist believes that the only way to achieve his goal is through terrorism and the utility 
of using terrorism as a means of achieving that goal outweigh the potential consequences, 
he will engage in the act. 
Rational Choice and the Use of Rewards 
In the RCT literature, scholars almost exclusively focus on the deterrence aspect 
of rational decision making and how punishment alters crime behaviors (e.g. Nagin, 
1998; Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, Matsueda, 1986; Shavell, 2002). Researchers have, 
however, been negligent in their focus on how benefits of not committing crime factor 
into rational decision making. At its core, RCT does not naturally favor either the stick or 
the carrot explanation of behavior. One of the first researchers to examine the effects of 
using a combination of both rewards and punishments was psychologist B.F. Skinner 
(1953). In his research on operant conditioning, Skinner noted that researchers could 
shape subjects’ behaviors through rewards for positive behavior as well as through 
punishments for negative behavior. Rewards can either be the removal of negative stimuli 
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or receiving positive stimuli. Punishments, in turn, are either the addition of a negative 
stimuli or the removal of a positive stimuli.  
In criminology, the idea of rewards is more abstract than rewarding children with 
candy after performing the desired behavior. When discussing the rewards of non-crime, 
criminologists typically frame the concept in terms of the opposite of a consequence. For 
example, potential criminals would maintain freedom if they do not commit crime, but 
lose freedom if they commit crime. Criminologists have used informal rewards, such as 
family and friends’ approval (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990), as a reason for not committing 
crime but criminologists and criminal justice practitioners rarely examine formal rewards. 
Other researchers have added different bounding features such as vicarious experience 
(Stafford & Warr, 1993), morality (Parker, 2006; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; 
Stanovitch & West, 2000), and the effect of group behavior (Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996).  
Additionally, while responsive regulation is a corporate crime theory of 
punishment (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; Post, 2006), the theory promotes corporate 
choices for behavior. The pyramid of enforcement begins with persuading corporations to 
comply with regulations and laws. With each infraction, the corporation receives a 
harsher and harsher punishment. If the regulatory, civil and criminal sanctions are not 
effective at stopping the action, the enforcement pyramid recommends complete 
incapacitation. However, when corporations confess to the regulators, they often do so 
with the promise of immunity from sanctions (Post, 2006). In terms of operant 
conditioning, the rewards are the removal of the negative stimuli that a sanction would 
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bring. While they are not directly rewarding good behavior, the theory proposes that 
regulators should use the removal of negative stimuli as an incentive to follow the law.  
Alternatively to theories that have espoused the importance of using rewards to 
shape behavior, there are theories that discuss the negative effects that result from 
punishments. In theories of counterterrorism and crime in general, researchers have 
discussed the idea of a backlash effect (Braithwaite, 2005; LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009; 
Sherman, 1993). The backlash effect refers to a response to sanctions that results in an 
increased amount of crime, terrorism or violence as opposed to a reduction in crime, 
terrorism or violence. Within the criminal justice literature, Sherman (1993) discusses the 
concept of defiance theory, which predicts that overly harsh punishments will not deter 
criminals but will create more crime and defiance within the punished criminals. 
Braithwaite (2005) discusses how defiance is much more likely when considering a 
restriction that is more central to an individual’s identity or is especially important to 
him. Within terrorism literature, the idea of identity and religion are essential (Roy, 
2004). Braithwaite (2005) would then predict that restrictions upon religion and 
restrictions upon religious political activism would spark an incredible amount of 
defiance. Defiance in relation to restrictions on religion and religious activism is exactly 
what Algeria encountered in the 1990s, which is why it is necessary to use alternatives to 
overly harsh penalties (Roberts, 2003). 
Organizational Structure and Rational Choice Theory 
 Except for lone-wolf terrorists such as the Unabomber, most terrorists act at the 
group level (Crenshaw, 2000; McCauley & Mokalenko; Victoroff, 2005), and prior 
research (Roy, 2004) suggests that nearly all of the terrorist operatives in Algeria act at 
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the group level. As such, this analysis of terrorism is couched within organizational level 
theories of group behavior. More specifically, I use organizational level RCT to examine 
how counterterrorism policies can affect terrorism in Algeria. Dugan and Gibbs (2008) 
noted that the interaction amongst group members in terrorist organizations is an 
important factor when determining effective counterterrorism policies. Therefore, it is 
necessary to utilize organizational level theories to explain actions committed by terrorist 
organizations. 
In general, organizational level RCT was formed to explain why businesses and 
individuals within corporations continue to commit crimes in the face of sanction threats 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1993). In this version of RCT, the authors discuss two types of 
potential consequences for committing crime: utilitarian or instrumental consequences 
(i.e. serving a prison sentence) and nonutilitarian or moral consequences (i.e. losing self-
respect). Essentially, two parallel decision making processes occur in the organizational 
RCT. A potential criminal must decide if the benefits of the crime outweigh the potential 
criminal sanctions and also if the potential crime fits in with the decision maker’s ethical 
code. In addition to the two decision making processes, potential criminals act within the 
context of a larger organization. The organization’s rules and norms, in turn, affect how 
the potential criminal judges both the utilitarian and nonutilitarian consequences to a 
crime.  
To illustrate the dual processes, take the example of an employee who works at a 
firm where sexual harassment is fairly common. There would little utilitarian 
consequences for telling sexually explicit jokes to a female co-worker because other 
jokesters had not received sanctions for their comments. Additionally, there is little 
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chance of nonutilitarian consequences because colleagues witnessing the explicit jokes 
would be likely to accept the comments as normal office behavior. The jokester might 
even increase his social standing by making the comments. However, the employee might 
not be willing to tell the same joke at a religious group function because it would be 
outside the norm of acceptable behavior. Past jokesters at the religious functions might 
have been criticized for their comments (utilitarian) and the jokesters could have lost 
social esteem (nonutilitarian) in the process. 
In addition to the dual decision making process, Paternoster and Simpson (1993) 
add a level of decision making to traditional RCT. In their model, the authors describe 
decision making within the context of a group. Decision making within a group context 
means that the decision maker must determine if the action fits with the group’s norms, 
but also with their goals. In the above example, the employee making the sexually 
explicit comments changed his behavior depending on the group context. In order to 
make the decision of whether or not to make the sexually explicit comment, he had to 
determine whether or not the group he was in would judge him favorably or unfavorably. 
By choosing to make the joke at work, he is conforming with the group norms and 
potentially furthering the office “brotherhood.” However, at the religious function he 
would be outside of group norms and detract from the group goal of fellowship.  
Therefore, I use organizational level RCT for two reasons. First, Paternoster and 
Simpson’s (1996) RCT model accounts for a dual decision making process. They 
consider the instrumental weighing of the importance of potential criminal sanctions 
against the benefits of committing the crime as well as the “moral” consequences of 
social sanctions for committing the crime. By morality, the authors refer to the question 
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of whether an action is inherently ethical. According to this argument, morality is similar 
to utility in economics. In economics, utility depends on norms and values. Morality, in 
turn, is also shaped by norms and values (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). It is important 
to consider the morality of actions in the context of terrorism, and especially religious 
terrorism. There is substantial evidence (Hoffman, 1995; Hoffman, 1999; Post, Sprinzak 
& Denny, 2002) that terrorists believe that they are doing what is right and moral. I use 
the term “socio-instrumentality” throughout the rest of this paper because it combines the 
idea of threat of instrumental and social punishment. 
Second, this model of RCT accounts for the effect of group influences on decision 
making (Paternoster & Simpson, 1993; Vaughan, 1998). Paternoster and Simpson (1993) 
expand upon traditional RCT by adding the context of committing a crime in a group. 
Group norms are important to consider as they can alter what type of behavior is 
acceptable for achieving goals. By definition, terrorists are seeking to achieve social, 
economic, political or religious goals (LaFree & Dugan, 2007).  There are many 
organizations that also seek to achieve these goals but do not consider violence or threats 
of violence acceptable means of achievement. Thus, the effect of groups is important 
when studying terrorists’ behavior.  In the next section I discuss the role of groups in 
decision making and then discuss the role of socio-instrumentality within Islamist 
terrorism. 
It is important to consider the role of a collection of individuals because of the 
interpersonal dynamics that arise within groups. For example, if people believe that they 
must follow orders from others they view as leaders, they are more likely to obey the 
directives of these others (e.g. Milgram, 1963). In groups, there is a combination of 
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individual decisions made within the larger framework of an organization (Vaughan, 
1998). As a result, choices are made under the dual constraints of individual and 
organizational bounding factors (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2002). 
In addition, socio-instrumentality may be especially important to consider for 
religiously based groups because it is often one of their bounding qualities for rationality. 
While it is sometimes difficult to view terrorism as moral or rational, many might find the 
idea of defending one’s identity and livelihood as much easier to grasp. For example, 
most people can understand the goal of survival and engaging in activities that promote 
survival. Thus, individuals find it rational to steal a loaf of bread to stave off starvation. 
Outside observers might also agree that the bread thief is morally correct in stealing the 
bread, especially if the bread is to feed hungry children.  
Terrorists’ goals are, at times, more abstract and difficult to conceptualize than 
stealing a loaf of bread to prevent starvation. In the case of Algerian terrorism, and more 
generally, Islamist terrorism, the goals are to create an Islamic nation (e.g. Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs, 2009). Like the person willing to steal a loaf of bread to survive, 
the terrorists were willing to commit mass murder to achieve their goal of an Islamic 
nation because they perceived it as the only option available to them. Islam is the center 
of their identity; therefore, those who question the role of Islam in the government are 
questioning their identity as individuals (Roberts, 2003; Roy, 2004). In this investigation, 





A Review of the Literature 
Traditional counterterrorism deterrence models predict that the increased 
certainty, severity, swiftness of punishments will lead to less terrorism. However, these 
models have not fared well when tested in the terrorism literature (e.g. LaFree, Dugan & 
Korte, 2009). Alternatives to deterrence models have been examined in fewer works, but 
are becoming more popular. To develop a more complete understanding of the effects of 
counterterrorism and to help create a responsible, evidence-based counterterrorist policy, 
it is important to consider what alternatives are available in terms of counterterrorism. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research findings of studies that have 
examined the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies under the framework of Rational 
Choice Theory. 
Rational Choice Theory and Terrorism: Findings 
Rational choice perspectives have long been integral to investigations of terrorism 
(Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005; Enders & Sandler, 1993; 2002; Frey, 2004; Frey & 
Luechinger, 2004). Both deterrence counterterrorism strategies and negotiation strategies 
fall under the umbrella of RCT. On the one hand, deterrence strategies increase the costs 
of a potential terrorist action. On the other hand, negotiation strategies increase the 
benefits of not committing crime or terrorism.  
Within the framework of terrorism, RCT has been used to explain the 
effectiveness of various counterterrorism measures. In the criminological literature, RCT 
has been used to explain terrorism from many angles (Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005; 
Frey & Luechinger, 2004; LaFree, Korte & Dugan, 2009). In one examination of RCT, 
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economists Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) used ARIMA modeling to test the success 
of four American counterterrorism policies. The study indicated that when presented with 
some traditionally deterrent policies such as the introduction of metal detectors as a 
means of preventing hijacking and increased security for American diplomatic targets, 
there was a reduction in terrorist attacks against the United States. Likewise, Dugan, 
LaFree and Piquero (2005) found support for RCT deterrence in their study of the use of 
metal detectors on the overall frequency of hijacking. Additionally, they found that when 
Cuba criminalized hijackings, there were fewer hijacked planes that diverted to Cuba. 
Therefore, within the literature, there is some support for the use of RCT when examining 
terrorism and the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies. 
However, other studies have found mixed results for traditionally deterrent 
perspectives to combat terrorism (Enders, Sandler & Cauley, 1990; Frey, 2004; LaFree, 
Dugan & Korte, 2009). One of the reasons it is necessary to look at alternatives to purely 
deterrent theories of counterterrorism is that within the terrorism literature there has been 
increasing evidence that counterterrorism strategies based on harsh punishment have a 
backlash effect in which the policies are related to an increase in terrorism (Brophy-
Baermann & Conybeare, 1994; Davis & Jenkins, 2004; Enders, Sandler & Cauley, 1990; 
LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009; Lum, Kennedy & Sherely, 2006). While Enders, Sandler 
and Cauley (1990) found that some American counterterrorism policies led to a reduction 
in terrorism, they also found that the 1986 American strike against Libya resulted in an 
increase in terrorist attacks. Likewise, in their investigation of British counterterrorism 
policies in Northern Ireland, LaFree, Dugan and Korte (2009) found a statistically 
significant backlash effect for three different counterterrorism policies. In this study I 
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propose that governments should use alternative deterrence policies when dealing with 
religiously based terrorism.  
The Use of Rewards as an Alternative to Punishment 
Psychologists have done several studies on the use of rewards to shape behavior. 
Under the operant conditioning paradigm of using rewards to shape behavior, Podsakoff, 
Todor and Skov (1982) found that when leaders offered their subordinates rewards, the 
subordinates had better performance and there was higher performance satisfaction 
amongst the workers. In the punishment conditions, there was no effect on the 
subordinates’ performance. This finding suggests that performance-based rewards are 
more effective at encouraging continued good performance than performance-based 
punishments are at encouraging good performance. Fehr and Gächter (2000) reviewed 
many studies about positive reinforcement to shape behaviors and found support for 
positive reinforcement such as the smiling waitress who is tipped more than the neutral 
waitress. 
At the extreme end of the behavior modification-reward spectrum is research on 
drug addiction. It is generally accepted that drug addicts find using their drug rewarding 
and that drug addicts will alter their behavior in the quest for that reward. In fact, research 
on drug addiction has found that the same reward sensitive areas of the brain are 
triggered upon receiving addicts’ drug of choice (Noble, 2000) as are activated when 
using reward-based learning in Parkinson’s patients (Frank, Seeberger & O’Reilly, 2004). 
Thus, humans are hardwired to respond to rewards (Hyman, 2005). It follows that 
terrorists should respond to rewards as a means of reducing terrorism.  
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Support for Organizational Level Theories 
 One of the classic studies that demonstrates the importance of decision making 
within a group setting is Milgram’s (1963) seminal experiment examining obedience. In 
this study, subjects were told that they would be participating in a study examining the 
use of punishments in learning. Subjects were instructed by the experimenter to shock the 
“learner” at increasingly high voltages if the learner answered a question incorrectly. In 
actuality, the study measured what level of shock the subject would administer after 
being told by the experimenter to shock the learner. Nearly all subjects administered the 
maximum shock while the person being “shocked” screamed in pain. While this study 
was aimed at showing the dangers of extreme obedience, in the context of my study, 
Milgram (1963) lends evidence to my belief that it is important to use organizational 
level theories when studying terrorist group behavior. Alone or in any other context, the 
subject may not have shocked the learner to the maximum voltage. However, in the 
context where the subjects felt as if they were expected to shock the learner, they 
followed the lead of the experimenter and the group norms. 
In the Paternoster and Simpson (1996) RCT model of corporate offending, the 
idea of multiple levels of decision making and group behavior is especially salient for 
examining terrorists’ behaviors. For corporations, the authors discuss the costs and 
benefits for individuals within the corporation as well as for the company as a whole. In 
their study, the authors found that when making decisions about whether or not to 
commit a corporate crime, individuals whose corporation’s norms were more accepting 
of corporate crime were more likely to be willing to engage in corporate crime 
themselves. To lend further support to the notion that the effect of a group structure is 
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important when making rational decisions, in a study of safety failures in NASA, 
Vaughan (1998) found that employees increasingly made more careless mistakes as the 
culture in NASA became increasingly lax in regulating their employees. Essentially, 
individuals feed off of each other and interact to create a group culture that is accepting 
of indiscretions.  
Likewise, in interviews with 35 terrorists Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2002) found 
that the terrorists entered the organization thinking of themselves as individuals, but the 
longer that the individuals were in the group, the more they began to think of the group’s 
goals above their own. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) also discuss a group 
interaction dynamic when political parties radicalize into terrorist organizations.  This 
notion of thinking of the group above the individual lends further credence to the use of 
organizational level theories to explain terrorism.  
Socio-instrumentality 
In a review of the psychology of terrorism literature, Victoroff (2005) proposes 
that terrorists really do consider themselves to be acting logically and that their actions 
are just and ethical. According to Hoffman (1995), terrorist groups have used religion as 
justification for their actions for centuries. Religion, especially Islam in Algeria, has 
become a sense of identity for the terrorists (Rapoport, 2004; Roy, 2004). Because 
religion is vital to the sense of identity and culture, the benefits of committing an act of 
terrorism in the name of the faith far outweigh the consequences of being punished for 
the action. Some might even believe that there are more consequences to standing idly by 
while their faith is not given the respect it deserves (Hoffman, 1995; Juergensmeyer, 
2003; Rapoport, 2004; Roy, 2004). Therefore, utilizing a theory that considers ethics such 
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as the socio-instrumentality as a factor for decision making is necessary when studying 
terrorism. 
Kruglanski and colleagues (2006) examined the role of collectivistic versus 
individualistic goals of 1,042 citizens of Muslim nations as predictors of support for 
using violence against the US and Europe. This study defined collectivistic goals as goals 
that seek to improve the status of a group as opposed to an individual. In the study, the 
researchers found strong support for collectivistic goals being related to an increased 
support for violence against the US and Europe. These group goals and the belief of 
purpose transcend individuals’ sense of self into a larger meaning which drives their 
actions.  
Alternatives to Deterrence 
 The importance of socio-instrumentality enters when considering why particular 
counterterrorist measures should be effective. For example, terrorists require a support 
base to be effective in their political movements (Dugan, Huang, LaFree & McCauley, 
2009). In socio-instrumentality, one of the potential consequences that would-be terrorists 
must consider is their social standing after committing the attack. If the terrorist group’s 
constituency views the organization’s actions as immoral, then the organization is more 
likely to lose support. If the organization loses support, in the socio-instrumentality 
perspective, they should use terrorism less frequently.  
A clear example of this phenomenon comes from the case of Armenian terrorist 
organizations ASALA (Dugan et al., 2009). ASALA originated as a terrorist organization 
that was dedicated to drawing attention to the Armenian genocide. To obtain this goal, 
the organization systematically attacked Turkish government officials and Turkish 
18 
 
targets.  However, the group virtually collapsed after an ill-fated attack on the Orly 
Airport in Paris (Dugan et al., 2009). As a result of the Orly attack, the support for 
ASALA’s actions ended abruptly as did the group itself. Therefore, within the structure 
of terrorist organizations, whether it be from the support base or elsewhere in the group 
structure, there is a sense of what actions are acceptable within the cause. In this case, 
attacking Turkish officials was more acceptable than attacking non-Turks and the 
resulting loss of support was a social sanction on ASALA. This social sanction was an 
effective method of reducing terrorism. 
 Braithwaite (2005) further outlines the role of a terrorist group’s support base. 
The author points to the importance of a Diaspora believing in and financially supporting 
the cause as a reason for the continued success of the Irish Republican Army. To prevent 
the continued support of a terrorist organization and to prevent the growth of those 
organizations, Braithwaite suggests a double-barreled containment and enlargement 
policy. Containment is the process of preventing the expansion of the terrorist group’s 
support base. Enlargement refers to an increase in social justice, democratic ideals, 
freedom from poverty and fulfilling other basic needs.  
 Therefore, from a RCT perspective, a counterterrorism sanction that focuses on 
presenting political alternatives to terrorism should be effective for two reasons. First, if 
the policy involves increasing the benefits of not committing terrorism, the group will 
have more to gain by not engaging in terrorism than by engaging in terrorism. If terrorists 
are, as I assume, to be rational thinkers, they will be more likely to reduce the frequency 
of their attacks. Secondly, if a counterterrorist policy presents an alternative to terrorism 
that represents a more socially acceptable alternative to terrorism, the terrorists will be 
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more likely to reduce the frequency of their attacks. From a RCT perspective, the 
terrorists need their support base to maintain operations in a particular country or region, 





The Current Study 
Why Algeria? 
In regards to counterterrorism studies, Algeria presents an interesting case study 
for several reasons. First, the country is a democratic nation that has, in recent years, 
served as a liaison between Africa, the Middle East and Europe (Zoubir, 2002). Some 
scholars have also noted that Algeria has been one of the few moderately successful 
Middle Eastern democracies (Bouandel, 2005). Thus, using their policies as a model for 
Middle Eastern counterterrorism policies may be useful. Counterterrorism scholars have 
long used the country-case study method in the study of policy efficacy (see Lum, 
Kennedy & Pronin, 2006). It is important to use a specific nation because the context that 
the person or group is operating in will also affect the outcome of the behavior that is 
being learned (Dragoi & Staddon, 1999). In terms of frequency and severity of terrorism, 
between 1992 and 2004, experts estimate that between 100,000 and 200,000 Algerians 
died in the terrorist violence. Finally, according to Laqueur (2003), Algeria represents an 
extreme case of Islamist terrorism and a highly influential nation in the growth of Islamist 
terrorist networks across North Africa and the North African Diaspora. Islamist terrorism 
has come to the forefront for policy makers, which makes Algeria a salient nation for an 
examination of counterterrorism policies. Therefore, for this investigation, I focus on 
Algeria for its importance as an emerging democracy in North Africa, its severity of 
terrorism, and its religiously based terrorism. 
The Algerian government employed a number of tactics throughout the 14 years 
included in this study period. For example, the government attempted to involve the 
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terrorists in political discussions, criminalized terrorism, and also offered amnesty to 
terrorists who turn themselves in. In this study I examine the Rome Platform (a tactic 
used to engage terrorist organizations in the political process), criminalizing terrorism, 
and the amnesty program known as the Civil Concord Act. The Algerian government 
created another amnesty program in 2005, but it lies outside the purview of this 
assessment. Future analyses should examine the effectiveness of this policy. 
Algerian History 
Algeria presents an interesting study of terrorism due to its importance on the 
world stage as a democratic and Islamic nation (Entelis, 2006). Before independence 
from France in 1962, Algeria had been a colony or territory of another, larger nation or 
empire for all of its existence. Arguably the most profound impact on the course of 
Algerian history occurred in the 7th and 8th centuries CE.  During this period, Arabs 
invaded Algeria and brought with them a language and a religion that were completely 
adopted by the local culture. Islam quickly became the main religion and basis of law for 
the Algerian people (Horne, 2006; Layish, 1995; Mayer, 1995; Roberts, 2003). Even after 
European influences from the Spanish and the French in later centuries, Algerians 
maintained their Islamic identity (Roberts, 2003). Islam’s role in the government has 
been a much contested issue that sparked a major violent political conflict in 1991.  
After ten centuries of Arab and Islam influenced government, the French took 
control of Algeria in 1830 (Toth, 1993). The abrupt shift of governance, law and culture 
built tensions throughout Algeria (Le Sueur, 2001) and the tensions between the French 
and the Algerians came to a head in the fall of 1954 when the Algerians launched the first 
attack that would lead to the Algerian War for Independence (Horne, 2006).  
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On All Saints Day of 1954 (Toussaint Rouge) groups of Algerian fighters planned 
an attack on the French occupiers. The date was reportedly chosen because the pieds 
noirs (Europeans or those of European descent living in Algeria) were strongly tied to the 
Catholic faith; therefore, an attack on All Saints Day would benefit from a lack of police 
officers to protect against the attack (Horne, 2006). While the All Saints Day Revolt did 
not end French colonial rule as organizers had hoped, it did allow for the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) to publicly espouse its goals and gain support for future attacks. 
Among the goals were the “restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and 
social within the framework of the principles of Islam” and unity with Arabo-Islamic 
Northern Africa (Horne, 2006: 95). These goals provided Algerians with a defined 
purpose and a commonality of identity that was previously lacking during French 
occupation.  
Foundation for a Nation and Terrorism 
After eight years of bloody conflict, the Algerians gained their independence from 
France in 1962 (Horne, 2006). Thankfully for the fledgling government, in the years 
following the revolution, there was relatively little violence and few terrorist attacks 
(Roberts, 2003). During that period, the Algerian government struggled with the post-
colonial problem of nation building. To help create a more cohesive country, the Algerian 
government made a number of changes within the structure of the nation. These changes 
resulted in varying degrees of success. The first change the government made was to 
collapse all political parties and create a single national party. According to Hill (2006), 
this strategy is one of the main methods of propagating political legitimacy and control in 
a postcolonial nation. Algerian President Ben Bella consolidated the political parties 
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immediately following independence so that the only party that was allowed was the 
FLN.  
The second change that the government made within the early presidencies was to 
launch a campaign to Arabize the schools, businesses and governmental agencies 
(Roberts, 2003). As a part of this process, schools began to instruct their students in 
Arabic rather than French. French had been the preferred language for nearly 150 years 
and Algerians met the abrupt shift with hesitation. The change was met with some 
resistance and some schools remained bilingual with instruction in both French and 
Arabic. As an unfortunate consequence of the differences in language education, 
graduates from monolingual Arabic schools lagged behind graduates from bilingual 
schools in the job market (Roberts, 2003).  These discrepancies caused a great divide 
between the nation’s elite who were educated in bilingual schools and the nation’s Arabic 
intelligentsia. In later years, the Arabization of the school system and the alienation of 
monolingual Arabic speakers in the workplace became a unifying point for terrorists and 
political activists.  
The third and most influential shift in the early presidencies was to make Islam 
the national religion of Algeria (Roy, 2004). Unlike language and political parties, Islam 
was a less divisive way to unite most, if not all Algerians, because the vast majority of 
Algerian citizens were Muslims. Islamizing the nation was a relatively simple and 
effective method of fostering cohesion in the young nation. Establishing Islam as the 
national religion made Algeria slightly different from a nation based on Islamic law. 
Algerians practice the Maliki branch of Sunni Islam, which is a method of creating and 
interpreting laws based on shari’a (Mayer, 1995). Shari’a is a system of practices within 
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Islam that are based on the Quran, the Prophet Mohammed’s actions (sunna), 
interpretations based on the Quran and sunna, and consensus among legal scholars 
(Layish, 2004).  However, within Algeria, laws are created in the “spirit” of Islam, but 
are not strictly created from shari’a practices. This system is different from Islamic 
nations such as Saudi Arabia, whose government considers the Quran the constitution 
and Iran, where mullahs are the supreme leaders of the country.  
The Birth of Terrorism in Algeria 
The importance of Islam became an issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s with 
the rise of the Fronte Islamique du Salut/Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party. After nearly 
30 years as a free nation, the Algerian government altered the constitution in 1988 to 
allow for political parties. In that year, FIS declared itself a political party. At this point, 
Algerians, for the first time, had options other than the FLN (Roberts, 2003). The 
multiparty system and democratic elections allowed two types of options for the Algerian 
population. First, it allowed the general population the opportunity to vote in a fully 
democratic election. Second, political activists were allowed the ability to express their 
beliefs in a constructive and legal manner.  
The significance of the transition to a multiparty system became fully evident 
during the 1991 parliamentary elections. During the elections, the FIS, which was an 
organization that strongly supported the creation of an Islamic state whose laws were 
based on shari’a, gained a majority of seats in Parliament. However, the sitting 
government was nervous about what a Parliament led by an Islamist organization would 
mean for the new nation (Roberts, 2003). FIS’s leaders were prominent members of 
society (the President and Vice President were both university professors) and were 
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interested in creating a nation governed by the Quran like Iran or Pakistan. As a result of 
the sitting government’s fear of what could happen, they ordered a military coup and 
invalidation of the election results (Roberts, 2003).  
The single action of ordering the invalidation of the election completely altered 
the Algerian way of life for years. Almost overnight, riots and terrorist attacks erupted 
across the country (Roberts, 2003). The government made significant changes all through 
1992 to try and stem the political tide, including dissolving FIS as a political party. 
However, the dissolution of FIS as a political organization completely removed the 
group’s option of acting in a non-violent manner and served as reinforcement for violent 
attacks (Roberts, 2003). The terrorism that followed between 1992 and 2004, by many 
reports, was some of the worst the world has ever seen and will be the subject of this 
investigation. 
Counterterrorist Tactics in Algeria 
Throughout the 1990s, terrorism was nearly an every day event in Algeria 
(Roberts, 2003). As a result, the government developed a number of counterterrorism 
policies. As a whole, the Algerian government employed traditional counterterrorism 
tactics such as criminal justice and military interventions (International Crisis Group, 
2001). However, at different points throughout the near civil war in Algeria, the 
government employed different negotiation techniques. In this paper I examine two 
different forms of negotiations with terrorists in Algeria: legalization and amnesty 
programs. 
The first type of negotiation addresses terrorists at their core—as a violent 
political organization. Based on the aforementioned definition of terrorism, terrorist 
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organizations seek to achieve political goals. Therefore, it follows that if a government 
were to use negotiations, concessions should allow for more political power. In Algeria, 
the Rome Convention was an attempt to give a political voice to a formerly 
disenfranchised political group (Roberts, 2003). The second attempt at negotiations was 
to use amnesty programs. These programs, as a whole, attempt to repair the damage done 
after a long period of violence (Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, 1998; Staub, 2006). Amnesties 
have been used widely in Africa, most notably with South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (Asmal, Asmal & Roberts, 1998), and have been met with 
varying levels of support (International Crisis Group, 2001; Mendeloff, 2004). 
Reconciliation and amnesty programs are policies that urge combatants to admit their 
crimes in exchange for lesser, or in some cases, no criminal sanctions. In Algeria, the 
Civil Concord Act of 1999 was the government’s attempt to end nearly a decade of 
violence that had claimed over 100,000 lives (Roberts, 2003). 
Rome Platform 
 At this point in terrorism research, there has been much debate as to how political 
parties escalate and radicalize into terrorist organizations (e.g. McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2008). Even within definitions of terrorism, political goals are highly prominent (LaFree 
& Dugan, 2007). Thankfully, not all political groups engage in terrorism (Wilkenfeld, 
Asal, Johnson, Pate & Michael, 2007). Neumann (2007) argues that analyzing a group’s 
goals and views on violence is important when creating a negotiation strategy. Therefore, 
when considering FIS, offering political means of solving grievances for terrorists would 
be an appropriate counterterrorism measure. In a simplistic application of the framework 
of Paternoster and Simpson (1996), if terrorists feel they have an opportunity to engage in 
27 
 
a more socially correct form of political activism, they will choose that over violence. 
The use of political power and opportunity was a salient aspect of the terrorism in Algeria 
(Roberts, 2003). Arguably the catalyst for nearly all of the terrorism problems in Algeria 
was the invalidation of the 1991 election. To exacerbate the problem, the Algerian 
government declared that FIS was no longer a legal political party in 1992. Therefore, 
one might assume that rectifying these problems would help to end terrorism. 
 In the early part his presidency, Liamine Zeroual made several attempts to use 
non-military means to end the terrorism in Algeria (Roberts, 2003). His presidency 
marked the beginning of a series of dialogues between the government and terrorists 
despite the fact that he was met with tremendous opposition. Between August and 
September of 1994, Zeroual met with several political factions, including the Palestinian 
group HAMAS, to create a truce between the terrorist groups and the government. 
However, the key player, FIS was not invited to this round of discussions. This oversight 
became a point of contention between the groups who were invited, who wanted FIS 
present, and the army, who did not want FIS present. Future discussions, however, would 
include FIS. 
To follow-up on the discussion with Zeroual, the groups met again to form what 
was to become the Rome Platform. The Rome Platform was slated as a compromise 
between the radical Islamic extremists and the more moderate government (Roberts, 
2003; Zoubir, 2002). In November of 1994, political parties first met at Sant’ Edigio 
Rome to settle the growing problem of terrorist violence in Algeria. During that process, 
seven political parties, including FIS, met to discuss the future of the government and 
terrorism in the nation. The Rome Platform was signed on January 13, 1995 by several 
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key players including FIS. In this document, FIS stated that they would reject “violence 
as a means of acceding to or maintaining power” (Roberts, 2003). The idea that FIS 
would reject violence as a tool to gain political influence is paramount to this 
investigation of counterterrorism. In signing the Rome Platform, FIS agreed that they 
would not engage in violence if they were constitutionally granted methods of acting in a 
political versus violent means to achieve power (Roberts, 2003; Zoubir, 2002). 
Essentially, they were stating that they would engage in a socially acceptable alternative 
to terror. 
 While the Rome Platform would have created a compromise that could have 
resulted in a mutually beneficial outcome with FIS receiving political rights and ceasing 
their violent campaign for rights, the Platform was not met by the support that many had 
hoped that it would (Roberts, 2003; Zoubir, 2002). Even though the United States was 
moderately supportive of the Platform, neither the Algerian nor the French government 
came out in support of the document (Zoubir, 2002). Roberts (2003) has suggested that 
the failure to accept the Platform was a sign of the military’s maintenance of control in 
Algeria. However the period between August 1994 and January 1995 still represents a 
time when the government was willing to negotiate with terrorists in Algeria (Zoubir, 
2002). The willingness to negotiate with the terrorists is an indication that the 
government was interested in utilizing alternatives to traditionally deterrent policies. The 
Rome Platform lays the ground work for future Algerian policies and in this analysis I 
test its effect on subsequent terrorist violence in Algeria. 
Civil Concord Act 
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Amnesty programs are one of the more controversial choices that governments 
make following a long period of violence in a nation (Gibson, 2002; Lie, Binningsbø & 
Gates, 2007). This type of program is created to help foster peace and reconcile 
differences after a long period of violence. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is one of the most well-known amnesty programs (Asmal, Asmal & Roberts, 
1998; Gibson, 2002). The purpose of the commission was to heal the damages due to 
violence during apartheid, allow for victims’ grievances to be heard, and allow for the 
perpetrators of violence to be given amnesty for their actions (Hamber, 1998). While 
amnesty programs have been scrutinized for the potential lack of justice (Gibson, 2002; 
Hamber, 1998; Lie, Binningsbø & Gates, 2007), researchers have found some support for 
the success of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission at the individual level and the 
country level of healing (Kaminer, Stein, Mbanga & Zungu-Dirwayi, 2001).  
For the most part, these studies looked at the effect of creating healing following 
the end of violence, or, in the case of South Africa, the end of apartheid. They did not, 
however, look at the effect of an amnesty program on initiating the end of violence. The 
success that Kaminer and colleagues (2001) found does give some credence to the belief 
that Algeria’s Civil Concord Act will see a reduction of terrorism. After the passing of 
the Civil Concord Act, television interviews of Algerian citizens about the Act had one 
common sentiment, “On veut la paix,” or “We want peace” (Thuillier, 1999). While 
South Africa and Algeria represent different cases, the desire for peace gives weight to 
the potential for the amnesty program to bring about a reduction of violence in the nation 
and promote a healing process.  
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Like other amnesty programs, the Civil Concord Act of 1999 served as a 
mechanism that allowed low level players in terrorist networks to renounce terrorism and 
cease terrorist related activities to avoid prosecution and receive mitigated sentencing 
(Algeria Watch, 1999). This law was devised by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in an 
attempt to stave off the tremendous violence that had ravaged the country for the past 
seven years (International Crisis Group, 2001). Essentially, the law allowed terrorists to 
receive either probation, a mitigation of a prison sentence, or have their cases dropped 
entirely in exchange for admitting committing terrorist actions. To gain amnesty, the 
confessors were required to give the specifics of each of the crimes that they had 
committed, which allowed police to corroborate the terrorists’ stories with police and 
news reports that had been filed. While the law provided amnesty for low level terrorists, 
it denied such benefits to anyone who had committed rape, murder, or mass murder. 
To qualify for the reduced sentencing, the terrorists were required to report their 
actions within 6 months of the law’s ratification. Therefore, free terrorists had between 
July 1999 and January 2000 to apply for the amnesty. For incarcerated terrorists, if they 
admitted to their acts and renounced all future acts of terrorism, their sentences would be 
mitigated, halved or given probation. The Civil Concord also solidified AIS’s ceasefire 
that occurred in 1997 (International Crisis Group, 2001).   
Reports indicate varying levels of acceptance of the Civil Concord Act (Arnould, 
2007; International Crisis Group, 2001; Joffé, 2008; Staub, 2006). In her analysis of the 
Act, Arnould (2007) indicated that the Civil Concord Act had only minor levels of 
success. Other researchers, such as Staub (2006) and Joffé (2008) lay the groundwork for 
why the amnesty program should be successful in Algeria. First, Staub (2006) proposed 
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that amnesty programs promote truth in the populace. The Civil Concord Act should 
promote truth from both ends of the spectrum. For the government, the Islamists promote 
forgiveness and truth by turning themselves in to the government and vowing to cease 
terrorist action. From the Islamist perspective, the government is offering a means of 
achieving goals through non-violence. Second, Joffé (2008) discusses the ideas of 
“aman” and “rahma”. Aman and rahma are deeply rooted Islamic principles of clemency 
and mercy in exchange for submission to the central authority. By creating the amnesty 
program in Algeria, the government was promoting the Islamic ideas of aman and rahma. 
In the previous section, I discussed how involvement in the political process gave 
terrorists something to gain; likewise, reducing terrorists’ sentences gives them 
something to gain. Even though the cause of Islamist terrorism goes beyond prison 
sentences for many terrorists, the Civil Concord Act was aimed at lower level terrorists. 
If the government can offer plausible alternatives to lower level terrorists, the 
government can get at the group’s core base of supporters. If the lower level terrorists 
take the amnesty and leave the group, the strength of the group would be reduced. Some 
policy specialists might want to focus their interventions on the higher ranking personnel 
within the organization, however it is highly unlikely that the upper level terrorists, 
especially Islamist terrorists, would ever be affected by interventions. If the government 
can get at the lower level terrorists before they have based their identity completely on 
Islamic extremism, then the terrorist groups will lose their support and go the way of 
ASALA. 
Criminalization of Terrorism 
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 One of the more popular forms of counterterrorism across the globe is the creation 
of specific crime codes that establish specific criminal penalties for terrorist acts (Dugan, 
LaFree & Piquero, 2005; Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). For Algeria, criminalization of 
terrorism was the addition of specific penalties and enhancements for crimes that were 
related to terror (Code Pénal, retrieved 2008). From a domestic government perspective, 
criminalization works to promote justice for the population being victimized. One of the 
ways criminalization promotes justice is through the use of the criminal justice system 
(LaFree & Hendrickson, 2007). Through the criminal justice system, terrorists are 
apprehended by police or law enforcement officials and prosecuted through the court 
system. LaFree and Hendrickson (2007) promote the use of a criminal justice approach to 
counterterrorism because it is more equipped to manage the cases than broad sweeping 
military interventions.  
There has been mixed support for criminalization as a tactic to deter terrorists in 
general (LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009) and specific types of terrorist attacks (Dugan, 
LaFree & Piquero, 2005).  However, one of the assumptions of criminalization as a 
strategy for combating terrorism is that the interventions are run by a police or law 
enforcement force instead of military responders (LaFree & Hendrickson, 2007). During 
the mid-1990s, when criminalization of terrorism was implemented in Algeria, the state 
was disjointed with the military acting somewhat autonomously from President Zeroual 
(Addi, 1998; Roberts, 2003). As such, the military often performed counterterrorism 
campaigns that were not explicitly authorized by the president, nor did the offensives fall 
within the bounds of the law (Addi, 1998).  In this study, criminalization serves as a 
control for traditionally deterrent counterterrorist policies.  
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Effect of Counterterrorism in Algeria 
Despite Algeria’s importance as an emerging democracy in North Africa and its 
role as the home base of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Gray & Stockham, 2008), as 
of April 2009, I have been unable to identify a single empirical analyses of terrorism in 
Algeria during the 1990s and early 21st century nor have there been any empirical 
analyses of Algerian terrorism during the war for independence (Crenshaw, 1995). In 
addition to the lack of analyses on terrorism in Algeria, there are no analyses of the 
counterterrorism policies the Algerian government utilized during the period of the study. 
Through a broader search for empirical analyses of terrorism in North Africa I 
discovered that there are few studies that attempt to explicate the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism policies (Enders, Sandler & Cauley, 1990; Goerzig & Hashimi, 2007). 
One study in particular, Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990), investigated the effect of 
American air raids on Libya in the 1980s. The study revealed that there was an increase 
in terrorism immediately following the countermeasure. An anecdotal investigation of 
counterterrorism policies used against Egyptian terrorist group Gamaa Islamia presents a 
similar dynamic as Algerian counterterrorism tactics (Goerzig & Hashimi, 2007). 
Following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981, the Egyptian government 
strengthened the deterrence aspect of their counterterrorism policies by increasing prison 
sentences and torturing suspected terrorists. However, the increasingly punitive measures 
did not result in a drop in terrorism. The introduction of negotiation tactics seemingly 
influenced Gamaa Islamia’s agreement to cease committing terrorist attacks.  While this 




• Hypothesis 1. The Rome Platform, which allowed terrorist groups the opportunity 
to use non-violent means to achieve a political end, will reduce the frequency of 
terrorism in Algeria. 
• Hypothesis 2. The Civil Concord Act, which gave terrorists incentives to obey the 
law, will result in a reduction of terrorism in Algeria. 
• Hypothesis 3. The Rome Platform will be related to a drop in the proportion of 
fatal terrorist attacks in Algeria. 
• Hypothesis 4. The Civil Concord Act will also be related to a drop in the 
proportion of fatal terrorist attacks in  Algeria 
To assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in Algeria, I have created 
four hypotheses. I draw each of these hypotheses from the RCT literature that I presented 
earlier. In this analysis, I examine the effectiveness of negotiation as a counterterrorist 
strategy. Effectiveness will be measured as a significant reduction in the frequency of 
attacks and/or a reduction in the proportion of fatal to total attacks. For these hypotheses, 
a negative relationship supports the RCT perspective that giving terrorists a reason to 
follow the law is effective in reducing terrorism. The proportion of fatal attacks to the 
total number of attacks addresses the moralistic/utility portion of Paternoster and 
Simpson’s RCT model. If there is a social-instrumentality component to the terrorists’ 
rational decision making, I expect that following both the Rome Platform and the Civil 
Concord Act that there will be a reduced proportion of fatal attacks to total attacks and a 
reduction in the proportion of civilian attacks to total attacks. 
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Hypothesis 1 is drawn from the RCT and terrorism literature that giving terrorists 
a legitimate means by which to obtain their goals (e.g. allowing a group to act as a 
legitimate political party) will be related to a drop in terrorism. From this perspective, 
there is more incentive for would be terrorists to act within the law instead of outside of 
the law. To examine the effectiveness of this policy, I will be looking at the Rome 
Platform. Likewise, Hypothesis 3 predicts that fatal incidents would decrease following 
the Rome Platform. Fatal incidents should decrease after the introduction of the Rome 
Platform if the terrorist organizations were considering the possible social sanctions and 
lack of support for killing Algerian citizens in the name of the cause after being offered 
the option of acting as a legitimate political organization.  
Hypothesis 2 examines the effectiveness of the amnesty policy. Like Hypothesis 
1, within the RCT and terrorism literature, I would expect that the Civil Concord Act 
would predict a reduction of terrorism. There should be a reduction of terrorism based on 
the idea of giving the terrorists incentives for not attacking. Within operant conditioning, 
the removal of a negative stimulus is a reward for following rules and the law. As such, 
by reducing terrorists’ prison sentences after admitting to the crimes as well as vowing to 
not commit the crime again will be related to a drop in terrorism. Again, like Hypothesis 
3, Hypothesis 4 draws upon the same notion of social sanction and support from the 
constituent group. As previously mentioned, news reports indicated that the Algerian 
population was eager for peace. If terrorists were considering the possible social 
sanctions of continuing to kill their fellow Algerians after getting the option of reduced 









This chapter describes the methodology I used to test the effectiveness of three 
Algerian counterterrorism policies. I use monthly counts of terrorist attacks in Algeria 
documented in the Global Terrorism Database from 1991 through 2004, supplemented 
with cases from the human rights organization Algeria Watch.  With month as the unit of 
analysis (N=168), ARIMA modeling is used to determine the effects of the following 
three interventions.  The Rome Platform was active between September 1994 and 
February 1995.  Criminalization was in effect between March 1995 and July 1999.  The 
third intervention, the Civil Concord Act, was in effect between August 1999 and 
February 2000.  As described below, it was measured as both a temporary intervention 
that ended in February 2000 and as a more permanent policy shift that continued through 
the end of the series.  
Data 
This analysis relies on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  The 
GTD currently is the most comprehensive open source database of terrorist events in the 
world. The events span the years 1970 to 2007 and were originally collected under the 
definition presented in LaFree and Dugan (2007, p. 184), “the threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through 
fear, coercion or intimidation.” This definition is broad in scope which allows for a more 
thorough analysis of the terrorist problem within the nation of Algeria. This particular 
analysis is updated up through March 2009 and uses data from 1991 through 2004. There 
were a total of 1,881 attacks in Algeria in the GTD between 1991 and 2004. The original 
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1993 were lost in an office move, so the 1993 data in this study were based on the 
average monthly attacks from the rest of the months in the data. The 1993 data have been 
imputed based on summary statistics provided by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence 
Service. The Pinkerton data indicated that there were 311 attacks in 1993 and the 
monthly distribution of the attacks for 1993 is listed in Table 1.  To impute the missing 
data, I determined what proportion each month represented of the total data. The first 
column in Table 1 represents the monthly attack frequency across all of the years of the 
study except for 1993. I then determined what proportion each month represented from 
the total number of attacks. With the monthly proportion, I used that figure to determine 
the approximate number of attacks for each month in 1993. For example, January 
represented 9.31% of all the attacks in the series. To determine the approximate 
frequency of attacks in January 1993, I multiplied the number of attacks in 1993 (311) by 
.0931 to obtain a total of 28.9541. Because there cannot be partial attacks, I rounded the 
attacks to the nearest integer. Therefore, I estimated that there were 29 attacks in January 
1993. 
Other terrorism databases were inappropriate for this study because they did not 
capture domestic events (e.g. ITERATE), did not contain events for the time periods 
studied (e.g., the National Counterterrorism Center’s World Incidents Tracking System), 
or were country specific (e.g. American Terrorism Database). A database that included 
domestic attacks was important to include because international attacks are far less 
frequent than domestic attacks. Additionally, between 1991 and 2004 nearly all Algerian 
attacks were domestic. Other databases did include the data parameters that were 
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necessary for the study. Therefore, because of the nature of the conflict in Algeria and the 
study’s time period, the GTD is the obvious choice over other data sources. 
To improve the comprehensiveness of the dataset, I compared the Algerian GTD 
cases to a set of terrorist attacks identified by Algeria Watch, a human rights’ 
organization.  For cases in Algeria Watch but not the GTD, the information was verified 
by at least two reliable media sources before being added to the dataset.  English and 
French news outlets in Lexis-Nexis were used to verify the attacks.  In total, I added 52 
attacks from Algeria Watch for a total of 1,933 terrorist attacks between 1991 and 2004. 
Analysis 
To determine the effects of counterterrorist interventions in Algeria, I use 
interrupted time series analysis. Interrupted time series analyses have been used in 
several recent empirical examinations of terrorism (Enders & Sandler, 2002; 1993; 
Pridemore, Chamlin & Trahan, 2008). More specifically, I use autoregressive integrated 
moving average model (ARIMA) analysis that accounts for the interrelatedness of time-
dependent variables. One reason to use the ARIMA model is that it allows the analyst to 
distinguish between the effect of an intervention and “noise” in the data (McDowall, 
McCleary, Meidinger & Hay, 1980). A second reason an ARIMA model is appropriate is 
that it addresses the fact that in time-sensitive data, each successive Y value will be 
related to the previous Y value. In other models, this process would produce error terms 
that would be serially autocorrelated. ARIMA requires the analyst to make a number of 
assumptions. To correctly estimate an ARIMA model, the random shocks must have a 
mean of 0, a constant covariance, an independence of shocks and a normal distribution.  
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The estimators within ARIMA are the p parameter to measure autoregression, the 
d parameter to measure the differencing necessary to achieve stationarity, and the q 
parameter to measure the moving average component. Essentially, ARIMA modeling 
cleans time series data to remove the interrelatedness of the random shocks caused by 
autocorrelation, the expected value of the random shocks if it is different from zero, and 
the overall trend of the data. Autoregression refers to the interrelatedness of the error 
terms such that the value at time t depends on the value time t-1. Stationary models are 
models where the random shocks have an expected value that is not different from zero. 
Differencing helps to create stationarity. Finally, the moving average component of the 
ARIMA model refers to distinguishing random white noise from the overall trend of the 
data. For example, the general trend for crime is that there is an increase of incidents 
during the summer months. ARIMA modeling would remove the element of trend in 
order to test the effect of an intervention or event, such as increased time spent out of 
doors, on the incidence of crime. 
Beyond a simple ARIMA, it is possible to test the effect of an intervention on the 
overall time series. Impact assessments are quasi-experiments that test to see if there is a 
significant difference in the data before and after the intervention (Dugan, forthcoming; 
McDowell, et al., 1980). For this assessment, I will be testing the effect of introducing 
three interventions with discrete beginning and ending dates as well as the effect of the 
Civil Concord Act as a permanent intervention on the ARIMA of terrorism in Algeria. 
Table 2 lists the interventions as well as the periods when they are active.  
In Table 2, all interventions are lagged. Lagging the intervention will help ensure 
that the models are correctly capturing the impact of the intervention. In real time, the 
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negotiations around the Rome Platform began in August 1994 and ended in January 
1995. However, for these analyses, the Rome Platform began in September 1994 and 
ended in February 1995. Likewise, Criminalization entered the Penal Code in February of 
1995, but in the analysis, its start date is March 1995. Criminalization continues until the 
Civil Concord Act’s introduction in July 1999. The analysis for the six-month window in 
which terrorists could seek amnesty through the Civil Concord Act begins in August 
1999 and ends in February 2000. Finally, I also test the effect of the Civil Concord Act as 
a fundamental shift in the government’s counterterrorism strategy. As such, I test the 
impact of the amnesty program from August 1999 through December 2004. The Rome 
Platform and criminalization were not extended because their policies had a clear end 
point. The Rome Platform ended when criminalization began. The increased sentences 
associated with the criminalization policy ended with the introduction of the Civil 
Concord Act. However, the Civil Concord Act was representative of a shift in overall 
government policy. In 2005, President Bouteflika initiated the charter for Peace and 
National Reconciliation, which indicates a continued commitment to alternatives to 
imprisonment for terrorists. 
For each of these interventions, I performed impact assessments. Impact 
assessments start with an initial ARIMA acting as a baseline for the analysis and measure 
how an intervention or important event affects the time series (Dugan, forthcoming; 
McDowell, et al, 1980). In the summer crime example, the initial ARIMA would clean 
the data so there were no trends, the data were stationary, and the random shocks were 
unrelated. An impact assessment would test the effect of school dismissal on the 
incidence of crime. Using an ARIMA model, criminologists can distinguish between the 
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effect of schools’ end dates from general trends and seasonal differences associated with 
crime. The interventions, in turn, are what drive the change in the model.  
For this analysis, I modeled the Rome Platform as a dummy variable for the six 
months of negotiations. The Rome Platform was a brief conference whose goals were to 
involve the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) into the political process. If political 
involvement were the main goal for FIS, I expect that there would be a sudden decrease 
in terrorism. However, because criminalization immediately followed the Rome Platform, 
I can only assess the intervention for a brief period of time. I believe it will have an 
abrupt, temporary impact because it is such a brief intervention. Therefore, in these 
analyses the variable will be represented as “0” pre-intervention, “1” during the 6 months 
of the intervention and “0” immediately following. Criminalization, in turn, is also a 
dummy variable that will be “0” before March 1995, “1” between March 1995 and July 
1999, and “0” from August 1999 through December 2004. The Civil Concord Act is 
active “1” from August 1999 through February 2000 and “0” in all other time periods. 
Finally, the Civil Concord Act as a permanent shift is a “1” beginning in August 1999 
and remains “1” through December 2004. 
Variables 
For this analysis, I will be focusing on the monthly frequency of terrorism and the 
monthly proportion of fatal to total incidents in Algeria. As such, the unit of observation 
will be the month (N=168). To test my hypotheses, I will be using the natural log of the 
total monthly attacks over time. I will be using the natural log of monthly attacks because 
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the data are highly skewed and do not meet the assumption of normally distributed data1. 
To avoid taking the natural log of 0, I added 1 to all months.  
The total monthly attacks will gauge how effective the three counterterrorism 
policies are at reducing terrorism in general. Ideally, I would include other variables as 
regressors. However, monthly values for potential correlates are incredibly difficult to 
find during this time period. Future analyses should examine external factors that could 
be related to Algerian terrorism. 
In the analyses that follow, I assume that the Rome Platform will have an impact 
from September 1994 through its end in February 1995. The intervention initially began 
in August 1994, but as stated above, I will be lagging the interventions to ensure that I am 
capturing a clear picture of the terrorism pre-intervention and post-intervention. 
Criminalization is active from March 1995 through July of 1999. The Algerian legislature 
added criminal sanctions for terrorism to the penal code in February 1995; therefore, the 
intervention begins in March 1995. The criminalization policy lasted until the enactment 
of the Civil Concord Act in July of 1999 and ended in January 2000. Therefore, the dates 
for this intervention will be August 1999 through February 2000. Finally, the Civil 
Concord Act as the representation of an overall shift to alternatives to deterrence will be 
represented from August 1999 through December 2004. 
 Figure 1 depicts the frequency of Algerian terrorist attacks over time from 1991 
through 2004. The dashed vertical lines represent the points where counterterrorist 
policies were enacted and ended. On the X-axis, the time is represented in months. The 
first policy, the lagged Rome Platform, occurred between September 1994 and February 
                                                 
1 Because terrorist attacks are, in most places, rare and also discreet variables, monthly counts of events 
will be positively skewed. Taking the natural log of the attacks each month creates a continuous variable 
and normalizes the data. 
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1995. Criminalization, the second counterterrorism policy, lasts from March 1995 
through July 1999. Finally, the Civil Concord Act was introduced during month August 






 In general, terrorism in Algeria erupted rather quickly following the invalidation 
of the 1991 elections. After that point, terrorism remained relatively stable until late 1997 
into early 1998. Following the peak in the late 1990s, terrorism declined through the end 
of the series. In this next section, I discuss how the interventions affected the trends in 
terrorism. 
Trends in Terrorism 
Across the series, there were approximately 10 attacks per month on average. 
Figure 1 indicates a general upward trend in terrorist events from January 1991 through 
December 1993. From January 1993 through April 1996, terrorism in Algeria declined. 
However, terrorism increases between May 1996 through December 1997. The spike in 
December and January can be explained by a number of attacks and massacres that 
coincided with the Islamic month of Ramadan. Following the spike in the late 1990s, 
there is a dramatic decline in terrorist incidents.  
Figure 2 shows similar trends in the frequency of fatal attacks2. In fact, not 
counting 1993 and the months where there were no attacks, 79% of all attacks in Algeria 
resulted in at least one fatality. This high figure is outside of the norm for terrorist 
attacks. According to LaFree & Dugan (2009), most terrorist attacks do not lead to 
fatalities, which is why Algeria’s percent of fatal attacks is an interesting variable to 
study. Table 3 depicts the proportion of fatal attacks over time. Throughout the course of 
the series, the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks to total attacks remains fairly stable and 
                                                 
2 The 1993 data were not included in analyses of the proportion of fatal incidents because it was impossible 
to determine from the information available how often incidents were fatal. 
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quite high. For example, in the 58 months preceding the Civil Concord Act 84.4% of 
attacks in Algeria were fatal. During the 58 months following the Civil Concord Act, 
67.2% of attacks resulted in fatalities. In the next section I will analyze these trends using 
ARIMA analyses to determine if the interventions such as the Civil Concord Act were 
related to a reduction in the overall frequency of terrorist attacks and the proportion of 
fatal terrorist attacks. 
Statistical Analyses 
 For these analyses, I used two different modeling structures to determine the 
appropriate effect of the interventions. First, I modeled interventions with an immediate, 
temporary change. Equation 1 presents this model. 
Yt= δYt-1+  ωIt + ε      (1) 
In this model ωIt represents the dummy intervention variable that equals “1” while the 
intervention is active and “0” pre-intervention and post-intervention (Dugan, 
forthcoming). The term δ represents the slope of the change as a result of the intervention 
and ε represents the random noise in the model. If the slope is near 1, then the changes 
are all permanent. All of my models represented permanent changes. Therefore, I 
modeled the interventions as gradual changes but with permanent effects (Equation 2).  
Yt=δYt-1+  ωIt+ + ε     (2) 
In this model, if the δ component is near 1 and significant, then the intervention is a 
gradual change with a permanent effect. All of my interventions indicated that they 
should have had gradual, permanent effects.  
Table 4 depicts the results of ARIMA (1, 0, 1) modeling of terrorist attacks over 
time without interventions (Model 1), with the Rome Platform (Model 2), with 
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Criminalization (Model 3), with the Civil Concord Act (Model 4), and with all of the 
interventions (Model 5). In each model, positive coefficients indicate an increase in 
terrorism while negative coefficients represent a reduction in terrorism. To test my first 
hypothesis (the Rome Platform would lead to a reduction in terrorist events), I would 
expect to find the Rome coefficient in Model 2 to have a significant and negative value. 
To test my second hypothesis that stated that the Civil Concord Act would lead to a 
reduction in terrorist attacks, I would expect to find a statistically significant negative 
value for the coefficient of Civil Concord in Model 4. Finally, to examine whether there 
is an effect of the combination of the interventions, Model 5 tests both hypotheses, I 
would expect to find that the interventions all led to reductions in terrorism at statistically 
significant levels. 
 Model 1 represents the base model on which all the rest of the models depend. 
The autoregressive, moving average, and intercept components are all significant (p<.01) 
and confirms that this is an ARIMA (1,0,1) process. In all of the following models, I am 
assuming that they follow the same ARIMA (1,0,1) process, so I have listed the values of 
the intervention, the δ value, and the intercept.  
 In Model 2, the Rome Platform intervention is significant (Z=-1.98, p<.05.). In 
model specification, I defined Rome as a gradual, permanent change to the series. 
Hypothesis 1 was based on the rational choice theory that increasing the benefits of not 
committing crime or terrorism will make potential criminals or terrorists less likely to 
engage in illegal behavior. This finding lends support to Hypothesis 1 that the Rome 
intervention is related to a reduction of terrorist attacks over time. It indicates that the 
Rome intervention had a significant impact beyond the initial white noise model. 
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 Hypothesis 2 predicted that by offering an amnesty program as an alternative to 
deterrence, terrorists will be less likely to engage in violent actions. I used Model 4 to test 
this hypothesis. If Hypothesis 2 were supported, I would expect to find that Civil 
Concord Act had a negative and significant coefficient. In this model, I modeled the Civil 
Concord Act as a gradual, permanent change. The Act did bring about a significant 
decrease in monthly terrorism in Algeria (z=-2.66, p<.01) and Hypothesis 2 was 
supported.  
 In addition to the individual analyses of each intervention, I combined all of the 
interventions into one, more general analysis. Model 5 depicts the effect of the Rome 
Platform, Criminalization and the Civil Concord Act on the data series. From this model, 
it is evident that only Civil Concord Act was marginally related to a significant change in 
the series (z=-3.07, p<.01).  
 In addition to the examination of how the overall terrorist trends were affected by 
counterterrorist interventions, I wanted to test how the interventions affected the 
proportion of fatal attacks to the total number. Each of the interventions had an effect on 
the series of terrorism frequency. The Civil Concord Act and the Rome Platform had the 
most significant impact. From a policy perspective, it is important to consider methods of 
mitigating the effect of terrorism, therefore if there are policies that are related to a 
reduction in the number of deaths, these policies are just as important as any policy 
related to a reduction in terrorism in general.  
Additionally, I am testing the concept of socio-instrumentality that I discussed 
earlier. In the context of this study, I am using the term socio-instrumentality to combine 
the ideas of instrumental and social punishment. If the terrorists are considering both 
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instrumental and social punishments, there should be a general reduction of terrorist 
attacks following the interventions as well as a reduction in the proportion of fatal to total 
attacks. The proportion of fatal attacks should decline because of the social consequences 
of a high number of civilian deaths. With a large number of fatal attacks, it is probable 
that the terrorist organizations involved would lose the support of the Algerian 
population. Therefore, if the terrorists are considering the social consequences of losing 
support from the population, I expect to find that there is a reduction in the proportion of 
fatal attacks to total attacks. 
 Like the analyses modeling the frequency of terrorist attacks, the analyses looking 
at the proportion of fatal attacks is best represented by ARIMA (2,0,0). Again, the data 
from 1993 were not included because it was not possible to determine how many of the 
attacks were fatal with the available information. Model 1b depicts the general model for 
the proportion of fatal attacks. For this series, the AR(1) component is significant 
(z=4.52, p<.01) and the AR (2) is significant (z=5.01, p<.01). Thus, this equation is a 
good representation of a white noise model. Again, testing the interventions’ effect on the 
series, I examined whether the interventions had an immediate, permanent effect, a 
gradual, permanent effect, or an immediate, temporary effect. As in the earlier time series 
analyses, I found that all of the interventions had gradual, permanent effects.  
The first intervention examined was the Rome Platform. In Model 2b, it is clear 
that the first intervention did have a statistically significant impact on the proportion of 
fatal terrorist attacks (z=2.30, p<.05). This result indicates that the Rome Platform was 
related to a statistically significant increase in the proportion of fatal attacks to total 
attacks. Additionally, this finding is the opposite of what I would have expected to find 
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and may indicate that the terrorists were not considering the socio-instrumentality of their 
actions when planning and executing their attacks. 
 The one policy where I would expect to find the greatest effect on the proportion 
of fatal attacks is the Civil Concord Act. I expect the greatest effect for this policy 
because 98% of the Algerian population voted in favor of the act. If terrorists were 
rationally considering their constituency and the socio-instrumentality of committing 
terrorist attacks when the opportunity to receive amnesty is available the terrorist should 
choose to not attack. However, Model 4b indicates that there is no difference in the 
proportion of fatal attacks after the Civil Concord Act (z=.23, n.s.).  
Finally, looking at all of the interventions in a single model produced no 
significant changes in the series. Using the proportion of fatal attacks to total attacks did 
not support the hypotheses that terrorists consider morality of their actions when 
determining whether to attack and how. Neither Hypothesis 3 nor Hypothesis 4 was 
supported. In fact, I found the opposite effect in the case of the Rome Intervention.  
In passing, it is interesting to examine the traditional RCT belief that 
criminalization of terrorism will lead to a reduction in terrorism because the potential 
sanctions will act as an increase consequence of committing the actions, I used Model 3. I 
modeled Criminalization as a gradual, permanent change. Model 3 indicates that 
criminalization as marginally significant (Z=-1.87, p<.10). While RCT would predict that 
if a rational choice process were occurring there would be a reduction in terrorism after 
criminalization, there was only a slight change from a white noise model utilizing this 
intervention. It is also interesting to note that in Model 5, the coefficient for 
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criminalization change signs which, had it been significant, would indicate that the 
intervention potentially could have been related to increase in terrorism across the series. 
 Looking at the criminalization policy, I would expect that if terrorists are 
considering the policies as a rational actor and taking morality into account, the addition 
of criminal sanctions should result in the reduction of the proportion of fatalities. From 
Model 3b, there is a marginally significant increase in the proportion of fatal attacks 
following the introduction of the criminalization policy (z=1.75, p<.10). Again, this 
finding indicates that following the introduction of policies that increased the criminal 





Discussion and Conclusions 
 Throughout this paper I discussed the importance of rational choice making in 
relationship to counterterrorism in Algeria. From the criminological RCT perspective, I 
developed two main and two sub-hypotheses about the effect of counterterrorism 
interventions on the overall terrorism in Algeria as well as the proportion of fatal attacks.  
To test these hypotheses, I used ARIMA modeling and data collected from open source 
material and from the Global Terrorism Database. The three interventions that I tested 
each emphasized a different aspect of rational choice theory. Specifically, I tested 
whether terrorists consider the benefits of not committing terrorism when faced with the 
choice of acting. From my analyses, I found support for the amnesty program and the 
negotiation policy for reducing the frequency of terrorist attacks. Criminalization was 
also marginally related to a significant reduction in the frequency of terrorist attacks. 
However, both the negotiation policy and criminalization were related to an increase in 
the proportion of fatal attacks to total attacks.  
 First, I examined the Rome Platform, which was a series of meetings and 
conferences designed to draw the terrorist group FIS into the political process. The 
intervention was related to a significant reduction in the incidence of terrorism in Algeria. 
However, the Rome Platform was also related to a significant increase in the proportion 
of fatal attacks. Essentially, the attacks became more efficient over time. One explanation 
for the increase in the proportion of fatal incidents was the increased presence of the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the United States 
State Department reports on Algeria and the 2004 report on terrorism indicate that GIA 
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was an incredibly prolific and deadly organization (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2009; 
United States State Department, 2005). While GIA first emerged in 1993, I do not have 
the data that would allow me to analyze the fatal attacks that occurred in that year. The 
increase in fatal incidents following the Rome Platform may be a result of the lack of data 
prior to the Rome Platform. Additionally, the increase in proportion of fatal attacks could 
be a reaction to the introduction of the criminalization policy so soon after the 
introduction of the Rome Platform. The quick transition from an inclusion policy to an 
exclusion policy could have sent mixed messages to the terrorist organizations. 
Additionally, the shift could also have indicated that the government was not predictable 
and the terrorists might not have trusted that they would be allowed to continue to 
participate in the political process. Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) found that a 
government’s predictability was a factor when determining the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism policies. Rapid shifts could reduce the government’s credibility as a deal 
maker, which could be one of the reasons why the Rome Platform had mixed results. 
 Second, I assessed the Civil Concord Act. This intervention was an amnesty 
program that lasted for six months. Arguably, if terrorists were considering the benefits 
of not committing crime as one of the determining factors as to why they should or 
should not act, the Civil Concord Act would have been a key policy. This 
counterterrorism tactic was widely publicized and many Algerians felt that it would bring 
some relief to the near daily attacks (Thuillier, 1999). The Civil Concord Act was 
representative of an overall shift in attitude within the Algerian government. As such, I 
tested the effect of the amnesty program as a representation of an overall government 
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transition that accepts unconventional counterterrorist policies and offers terrorists 
alternatives to violence. 
When looking at the Act as a transition from punitive policies to alternatives to 
deterrence, this period is related to a significant drop in terrorist attacks. From a RCT 
perspective, this finding lends support to the notion of using the benefits of not 
committing crime or terrorism as a means of reducing crime or terrorism. In the early part 
of the 21st century, the Algerian government took strides to resolve the decade long 
conflict (International Crisis Group, 2001). Through this policy, the government opened 
the door to terrorists by offering a political alternative to violence. 
Notably, the Civil Concord Act addresses the issue of utilizing amnesty programs 
to reduce violence as opposed to reuniting a nation after a conflict has ended (Botha, 
2008; Gibson, 2002; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998; Vicente, 2003). The 
majority of amnesty programs such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) 
in Chile, South Africa, and Uganda have been used to rebuild trust in a nation after a 
period of conflict and human rights violations that would not have been addressed had the 
TRCs not been in place (Lamin, 2003; Vicente, 2003). Within the literature on TRCs, 
authors have discussed the importance of victims of violence receiving justice while 
ensuring a stable, democratic government (Gibson, 2002; Lamin, 2003; Vicente, 2003). 
While amnesty programs and TRCs are intended to repair the damage of violence 
and human rights abuses, very few TRCs were used to motivate the cessation of violence. 
The Sierra Leone TRC in particular was similar to the Civil Concord Act in that they 
were both aimed at finding peace in a seemingly unending civil war (Lamin, 2003). 
However, unlike Algeria’s Civil Concord Act, Sierra Leone’s TRC granted blanket 
55 
 
amnesty in exchange for disarmament and demobilization. This distinction is important 
because the Civil Concord Act addressed both the reparation of harm by ending the 
violence and also promoting justice by not offering amnesty for the most severe crimes. 
The political shift represented a government commitment to peace. Future research 
should examine the 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation amnesty program 
to determine if there is a similar reduction in violence. 
Finally, I looked at the criminalization policy which created sentence 
enhancements for acts of terrorism. In criminological literature, rational choice theory has 
traditionally focused on increasing the consequences of committing crime or terrorism as 
a means of deterring potential criminals or terrorists. My analyses of Algeria’s 
criminalization policy revealed that there was only a marginally significant effect on both 
the frequency of terrorism and the proportion of fatal attacks. Not only did attacks not 
decline, there was lack of significance at the p<.05 level is the spike in attacks in late 
1997 into early 1998. During this period, GIA and the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) split from one another. GSPC initially split from GIA due to GIA’s 
gruesome tactics and refusal to cease attacking Algerian civilians (Boudali, 2007). This 
schism in conjunction with the massacres during Ramadan 1997-1998 are likely the cause 
of the spike in activity during this period. However, future research should examine the 
group relationships following the split of GIA and the GSPC.  
While it is interesting that the traditionally deterrent policy, an increase in 
penalties for acts of terrorism, was only related to a slight drop in terrorism and a slight 
increase in the proportion of fatal attacks. In the model with all of the interventions in 
place, it is striking that they Civil Concord Act maintained its significance as an 
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intervention that reduced terrorism. These findings point to the importance of examining 
alternatives to traditionally deterrent models. 
 In sum, my findings indicate that there is some support for a rational choice 
perspective for utilizing counterterrorism measures in Algeria. Traditionally deterrent 
policies, such as criminalization, were ineffective and policies that would increase the 
benefits of not committing terrorism were successful. Other studies have found that 
terrorists will often respond to counterterrorist policies with a backlash effect and commit 
more attacks (Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare, 1994; Davis & Jenkins, 2004; Enders, 
Sandler & Cauley, 1990; LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009; Lum, Kennedy & Sherely, 
2006). In this study terrorist attacks steadily declined after political alternatives to 
violence were enacted. This finding lends some hope to the effectiveness of future 
interventions. 
Implications 
 From a theoretical perspective, my findings indicate that criminologists have been 
negligent when focusing their investigations only on the punishment aspect of Rational 
Choice Theory as opposed to examining both the benefits of non-crime and the 
consequences of committing crime. In this study, the traditional deterrent policy of 
criminalization was not related to any significant change in the frequency of terrorism. 
However, the Civil Concord Act, which emphasized the benefits of not committing 
violence by offering amnesty to terrorists who willingly laid down their arms, was related 
to a significant decrease in the frequency of terrorism overtime. The Rome Platform, 
another alternative to traditionally deterrent policy, was also related to a decrease in 
terrorism. The combination of the two alternatives to strictly deterrent policies points to a 
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need for more research into what types of benefits for non-violence are related to the best 
outcomes for counterterrorist interventions. 
Additionally, my findings suggest that policy makers should consider utilizing 
non-traditional deterrent policies that increase the benefits of not committing violence. 
The success of the Civil Concord Act as a political shift from a punishment perspective to 
a more reconciliatory policy of seeking amends for the violence may be successful in 
other nations faced with terrorism. Many countries that have had long histories of human 
rights issues and political violence have used amnesty programs as a means of reuniting a 
nation following the cessation of violence (Gibson, 2002; Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 1998; Vicente, 2003), but few have used amnesties and Truth Commissions 
to end violence (Lamin, 2003) and even fewer have used amnesties to end terrorism 
(Botha, 2008; Jiménez, 1993). Algeria’s success with the Civil Concord Act demonstrates 
the benefits of utilizing multiple strategies for solving a complex issue like terrorism. 
While amnesties may not lead to success in all nations, they should be considered as a 
viable option within a nation’s counterterrorist policy. 
Finally, in the wider context of the criminal justice system, the findings indicate 
the importance of considering restorative justice programs as a means for solving crime 
problems. In their meta-analysis of restorative justice, Latimer, Dowden, and Muise 
(2005) describe the premise of a restorative as seeing crime as “a violation of people and 
relationships…rather than merely a violation of law.” Restorative justice, in turn, seeks to 
involve the offender, the victim and the community where the action occurred to come to 
terms with the action and discuss a way to move forward from the action. The authors 
found in their meta-analytic study that recidivism decreased following the use of 
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restorative justice tactics. However, more studies should examine the usefulness of 
restorative justice as a tactic for both fighting crime and terrorism and repairing the harm 
caused by crime and terrorism. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
While I believe that I have used the best data currently available to study Algerian 
terrorism there are a number of limitations to my study. Like many examinations of 
rational choice making, in the data that are available, there are no systematic ways of 
measuring how much the terrorists weighed the implications of each intervention. 
Qualitative interviews with members of the terrorist groups in Algeria would provide 
insight into how much the groups considered a cost-benefit analysis when planning their 
attacks. A further concern is the lack of information available as to how many terrorists 
took advantage of the Civil Concord Act. Reports indicate that approximately 6,000 
terrorists took advantage of the amnesty program (Botha, 2008), but there are currently 
no systematic reports on the circumstances surrounding their surrender.  
Arguably, the Civil Concord Act could be called a success because it was related 
to a reduction in the amount of terrorists operating in the country. By comparison, 
according to the Terrorist Organization Profiles Database (TOPs), the Basque terrorist 
group ETA had 300 members and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) had 
approximately 1,000 members. These numbers indicate both the size of the terrorist 
problem in Algeria and the success of the amnesty program. There were terrorists who 
did not turn themselves in during the amnesty program. Notably, the GSPC (a splinter 
group of GIA who later aligned with Al-Qaeda) criticized the terrorists who utilized the 
amnesty; however around 6,000 terrorists took advantage of the reduced sentencing 
59 
 
program. Data in the TOPs database currently estimates the number of active terrorists in 
Algeria at around 400—less than a tenth of its original strength. However, there are no 
good estimates of how many terrorists were operating in Algeria before the intervention 
to determine how significant 6,000 terrorists are to the total operation (Botha, 2008). The 
estimates above give some approximation of the amnesty program’s success, but if there 
were better data on the dynamics of the surrender and the amount of terrorists, analyses 
of the interventions’ effectiveness could be better measured.  
As a result of the success of the Civil Concord Act and the failure of 
criminalization, future research should look at other counterterrorist policies in Algeria 
such as the Charter for National Peace and Reconciliation (Botha, 2008). The Charter for 
National Peace and Reconciliation was not used in this study because it occurred in 2005 
and outside the span of the current data.  This intervention would be important to 
examine because it offered a more general amnesty for the terrorists in Algeria and 
represented continued belief in non-punitive means to end terrorism.  
Finally, it would be interesting to study the support for terrorists and the terrorists’ 
cause over time in Algeria. Polls taken at the time that the Civil Concord Act was 
instituted indicated overwhelming support for the introduction of the amnesty program. 
Researchers should examine any surveys or polls from the time period and conduct 
follow-up surveys on whether respondents thought that the amnesty programs would 
bring an end to the country’s terrorism and how their opinion of the terrorists’ goals 
changed over time. These surveys might be able to measure changes in radicalization 
tendencies, which is of growing importance to governments around the world. 
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 Unlike many studies of counterterrorist interventions that arrive at bleak 
conclusions, I present a more hopeful outlook for the way forward with counterterrorism 
policies. The Algerian government, an emerging North African democracy in the midst of 
a near civil war, was able to successfully reduce terrorism throughout their country. More 
importantly, through a successful amnesty program, they were able to reduce terrorism 
without further bloodshed. Within criminological research, my study presents a 
modification of traditional studies of rational choice theory. I have shown that terrorists 
are motivated by receiving the benefits of not committing terror, not simply by avoiding 
punishments. Future researchers should emphasize the importance of what objects or 
concessions can serve as motivating factors to utilize non-violent means of achieving 




Table 1. Imputation of 1993 Attacks 






January 151 0.0931 28.953 29 
February 137 0.0845 26.268 26 
March 157 0.0970 30.103 30 
April 77 0.0475 14.764 15 
May 124 0.0764 23.776 24 
June 122 0.0752 23.392 23 
July 132 0.0813 25.309 25 
August 188 0.116 36.0469 37 
September 145 0.0894 27.802 28 
October 137 0.0845 26.268 26 
November 111 0.0684 21.283 21 
December 141 0.0869 27.035 27 
 




Table 2. Periods of the Three Interventions 
Intervention Active Period 
Rome Platform 9/1994-2/1995 
Criminalization 3/1995-7/1999 




Table 3. Frequency of Attack and Proportion of Fatal Attacks by Year.3 
 
Year Frequency of 
Attack 
Proportion of Fatal 
Attacks 
1991 19 0.2023 
1992 231 0.5730 
1994 226 0.7907 
1995 185 0.8082 
1996 130 0.7808 
1997 339 0.8772 
1998 141 0.8499 
1999 113 0.9390 
2000 81 0.7385 
2001 66 0.8171 
2002 54 0.8642 
2003 26 0.9583 
2004 11 0.9167 
 
Total 1622 0.7782 
  
                                                 
3 Data from 1993 are excluded from this table because the frequency of fatal attacks is not available. 
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Table 4. Model of Terrorist Incidents over Time. 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z p 
Model 1 AR (1) .961 .029 32.61** .000 
 MA(1) -.588 .070 -8.40** .000 
 Intercept 1.81 .542 3.34** .001 
      
Model 2 Rome -.081 .041 -1.98* .047 
 δ .970 .026 37.80** .000 
 Intercept .119 .060 2.00* .046 
      
Model 3 Crim -.0784 .392 .10 .917 
 δ .966 .027 -1.87 .061 
 Intercept .124 .789 2.39* .017 
      
Model 4 CivConPerm -.143 .054 -2.66** .008 
 δ .921      .037 25.06** .000 
 Intercept .219 .093 2.36* .018 
      
Model 5 Rome -.164 .109 -1.51 .132 
 Crim  .108 .098 1.10 .273 
 CivConPerm -.083 .027 -3.07** .002 
 δ .956 .018 54.50** .000 
 Intercept .171  .047 3.68** .000 
      
**  significant at p<.01 * significant at p<.05 †significant at p<.10
 
Note: “Rome” represents the Rome Platform, a six-month period in which parties within Algeria included 
the Islamic Salvation Front in political discussions. For the purposes of this analysis, the Rome Platform 
begins in September 1994 and ends at the end of the series. “Crim” is the Criminalization variable and 
represents the period from February 1995 through June 1999 when terrorism was criminalized and terrorist 
convictions carried heavier sentences. However, the effect in this analysis begins in February 1995 and 
continues until the end of the series. “CivConPerm” represents the overall policy shift that occurred with 
the Civil Concord Act. This variable begins in August 1999 and ends in December 2004.
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Table 5. Model of Proportional Fatal Incidents over Time. 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z p 
Model 1b AR (1) .342      .076 4.52** .000 
 AR (2) .336 .067 5.01** .000 
 Intercept .560  .046 12.10** .000 
     
Model 2b Rome .050 .021 2.39** .017 
 δ .661 .060 10.97** .000 
 Intercept .156 .026 5.90** .000 
      
Model 3b Crim .033 .019 1.75† .081 
 δ .692 .059 11.73** .000 
 Intercept .154 .027 5.74** .001 
      
Model 5b CivConPerm .003  .014 .23 .818 
 δ .760 .047 16.03** .000 
 Intercept .139 .026 5.37** .000 
      
Model 6b Rome .056 .480 1.16 .246 
 Crim  -.005    .046 -.10 .919 
 CivConPerm -.005 .015 -.30 .765 
 δ .664  .060 11.00** .000 
 Intercept .155 .026 5.86** .002 
      
 **  significant at p<.01 * significant at p<.05 †significant at p<.10
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